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The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) allocates roughly $900 million
annually from its operations and maintenance (O&M) appropriation for facilities mainte-
nance and repair. Annual reports of facility condition, plant value, and maintenance and
repair costs provide the basis for apportionment of these funds to each of 15 major Naval
organizations (major claimants). Funding shortfalls have contributed to a chronic deferral
of maintenance and repair projects. The resulting backlog of critical unfunded require-
ments for facilities maintained by the O&M appropriation totaled $2 billion at the end of
fiscal year 1995. OPNAV's objective is to stabilize or reduce this backlog over time while
providing maintenance and repair funding for the major claimants consistent with readi-
ness objectives. This thesis develops a multiobjective, infinite horizon linear program to
determine multi-year maintenance and repair funding levels for the major claimants while
adhering to annual budget constraints and a standard Navy facility priority system linked
to operational readiness. The model produces funding recommendations that are manageri-
ally and administratively feasible, and it shows an improved capacity to apportion funding
consistently with the existing priority system.
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The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) allocates roughly $900 million
annually from its operations and maintenance (O&M) appropriation for facilities mainte-
nance and repair. Annual reports of facility condition, plant value, and maintenance and
repair (M&R) costs provide the basis for apportionment of these funds to each of 15 major
Naval organizations (major claimants). Funding shortfalls have contributed to a chronic
deferral of maintenance and repair projects. The resulting backlog of critical unfunded re-
quirements for facilities maintained by the O&M appropriation totaled $2 billion at the end
of fiscal year 1995. OPNAV's objective is to stabilize or reduce this backlog over time while
providing maintenance and repair funding for the major claimants consistent with readi-
ness objectives. This thesis develops a multiobjective, infinite horizon linear program called
OMAR (Optimization of Maintenance and Repair) to determine multi-year maintenance
and repair funding levels for the major claimants consistent with readiness objectives.
In the planning process the Director, Assessment Division (N81) is responsible for
analyzing how all Navy programs, under alternative multi-year funding levels, contribute
to the Navy's operational readiness. This analysis is complicated by yearly maintenance
and repair budgets committing more money to the program but achieving less backlog
reductions than another budget sequence. OMAR's design allows N81 to investigate the
effects of borrowing additional funds from other O&M programs in order to accomplish
more work on time and avoid real cost increases associated with deferring maintenance and
repair.
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), N4, is responsible for allocating
multi-year maintenance and repair budgets to each of the major claimants. When total
annual budgets are fixed, OMAR helps N4 determine how to allocate each year's budget in
order to give Navy-wide funding priority to maintenance and repair projects for facilities
most important to operational readiness.
Computational studies indicate that planners should borrow funds when: (1) the
decisionmaker indicates a quantifiable willingness to exceed the budget; (2) target backlog
levels are not being met; and (3) lower long term net costs would result from borrowing. A
comparison of critical backlog achieved by funding levels established in Program Objective
Memorandum 98 with those achieved by an optimal allocation restricted by the same fixed
annual budgets shows that more high priority work—that most relevant to operational
needs—is accomplished Navy-wide with an optimal allocation. Explicit modeling of total
noncritical project costs (deferrable backlog), not previously accomplished, shows that early
identification and reporting of noncritical M&R projects leads to better decisions regarding
multi-year total budget levels and claimant funding allocations.
xi
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I. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF NAVY FACILITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The Navy is embroiled in a growing internal debate about how it should allocate
scarce budget dollars between its force structure (e.g., procurement and sustainment of
ships, aircraft, and weapons systems) and its infrastructure (e.g., operations and mainte-
nance of airfields, piers, repair facilities, hospitals, and utilities) [Struble 1996]. The Navy's
principal concern is to provide infrastructure for the support of its operating forces at the
smallest possible cost. Long term factors affecting its ability include:
• mission definition and new mission requirements,
• decisions to change the size or structure of operating forces and their supporting
commands,
• decisions to outsource or privatize certain infrastructure functions,
• decisions to expand, realign, or close bases, and
• decisions to build or demolish existing facilities.
In the short term, however, infrastructure represents fixed capital and incurs sizeable ex-
penses for its operation, maintenance, and repair. In 1995, the Department of the Navy
(DoN) owned a physical plant valued at $137 billion. The Navy's 1995 budget for base sup-
port under the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) appropriation totaled $3.4
billion, including $899 million authorized for real property maintenance (RPM)—such as
routine maintenance, major repairs, design, and minor construction. At the end of the year,
unfunded, critical maintenance and repair requirements for the same facilities totaled $2
billion, or 222% of available funding [N44 1995].
A number of organizations on the Navy staff (Figure 1.1), primarily N4 (logistics),
determine maintenance and repair funding levels. The processes examine apportionment of
RPM funding in four major dimensions:
• major claimants (maintaining organizations);
• investment categories (functions performed by the facilities);
• priorities (relative importance of various facilities to the Navy's operational mis-
sion); and
• years in which maintenance and repair projects are to be performed.
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis addresses the problem of allocating multi-year maintenance and repair
funds from the 0&M,N appropriation to each of 11 major claimants. It presents a multiob-
jective, infinite horizon linear programming model to help OPNAV recommend multi-year
funding levels for the major claimants subject to annual budget constraints. The model con-
siders each of the above dimensions in determining how to reduce or stabilize maintenance
backlog while conforming to a standard Navy facilities priority system.
The remainder of this chapter describes the decision framework on which the model
is based. Chapter II reviews Operations Research literature pertinent to the problem and
investigates a number of infrastructure models designed to solve similar problems. Chapter
III describes the model's basic assumptions and then develops it in detail, defining all of
the data elements and their sources. Chapter IV identifies specific difficulties in the inspec-
tion and reporting systems, and proposes an alteration to the model to work with the data
currently available; it further summarizes computational experience with the Navy's 1995
annual inventory, reports, and budgets for years 1996-2003. Chapter V presents conclusions
and recommendations for further work. Appendix A describes and implements a standard
method of constructing a linear composite scale for preference analyses; Appendix B for-
mulates two finite horizon approximations used to solve the infinite horizon linear program;
Appendix C provides a list of acronyms; and Appendix D contains facility condition report
summaries, inventory data, and maintenance and repair funding levels from 1995 to 2003.
C. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES
1. Planning and Programming
The Navy establishes budgets through its Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS). As a part of the planning process the Director, Assessment Division (N81)
has two principal responsibilities relating to facilities management. In the Investment Bal-
ance Review (IBR), N81 acts as the Navy's "honest broker" by helping to balance the
competing requirements of mission and support areas for funding. It performs qualitative
and quantitative analyses of various program requirements and weighs the projected out-
comes of alternative funding options. As the assessment sponsor for the Navy's Readiness
Support Area (SA), N81 examines how various programs contribute to the Navy's opera-
tional readiness. As a part of both responsibilities, installation analysts require the ability
to analyze proposed RPM funding levels in light of long term goals, operational readiness,
competing requirements for funding, and facility condition.
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Figure 1.1. Organizational chart of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV).
Source: Larson and Palmer [1994], page 54. The chart illustrates the naming conventions. Spe-
cific divisions are shown only for N8; they are titled by adding a digit (e.g., Assessment Division,
N81). Subdivisions of N81 would be labeled N811, N812, etc. Notice that Headquarters, US
Marine Corps (HQMC) is not part of this staff; OPNAV and HQMC are the two major staff
organizations that manage the Department of the Navy.
Based on the results of the IBR and guidance from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of the Navy, the Director, Programming Division (N80) divides
the Navy's budget among the resource sponsors, who are responsible for managing DoN
programs and their requirements. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), N4,
is the resource sponsor for Support and Infrastructure (S&I) funding. As a part of the
programming process, N4 is responsible for developing the Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP)
for S&I, which allocates the S&T funding among.its constituent programs including RPM
—
in turn apportioned among the major claimants.
The Navy has a number of tools at its disposal to manage its real property main-
tenance program: a coherent organizational structure for facilities management; a detailed
inventory management system; inspection and condition reporting systems; and a com-
prehensive priority system that ranks maintenance and repair projects in order of their
perceived impact on operational readiness.
2. Facilities Management Organization
The Navy's facilities management organization has two main hierarchies, one acting
in support of the other (Figure 1.2). The first hierarchy consists of the Navy organizations
directly responsible for funding, managing and executing RPM funds. It mirrors the overall
sponsor/claimant structure of the Navy's programming and budgeting system; see, for
example, Larson and Palmer [1994]. The second hierarchy is the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC) and its subordinate activities, which provide professional engineering
support and data management. The following sections describe this organizational structure
from the top down, discussing the primary and supporting functions at each level.
a. Top Management
N4 is most directly accountable for the status of the Navy's shore installa-
tions. Other divisions within OPNAV exercise primary control over particular installations
or facility types and work with N4 in the management of S&I programs; these divisions
include Nl, N09B, and various divisions under N8 (see Figure 1.1).
Headquarters, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) is OP-
NAV's primary supporting organization for RPM decisions. NAVFAC works directly with
N4, collecting and maintaining inventory, engineering, and cost data to support OPNAV
decisions. Additional data come from annual reports (described later in the chapter) and
budget submittals from the major claimants and the NAVFAC engineering field divisions.
b. Mid-Level Management
OPNAV coordinates the activities of 20 major claimants (the subset re-
ceiving facilities funding from 0&M,N appears in Table 1.1). NAVFAC provides facilities
engineering support by geographic region (Figure 1.3), and designates one engineering field
division (EFD) or engineering field activity (EFA) to coordinate facilities engineering needs
of the major claimants located within each region.
c. Installation Management
Staff civil engineers at the major claimants coordinate the overall facilities










Figure 1.2. Simplified schematic of the Navy facilities management organization. Reports of
facility condition flow up the solid lines to parent organizations; funding flows from the top
down. The arrows indicate NAVFAC engineering and decisionmaking support. The diagram is
simplified because each of several activities jointly occupying an installation may report to a
different major claimant; similarly, each major claimant may report different sets of facilities to
different resource sponsors.
Works Detachments (PWD), each supporting one or more installations, perform or contract
all facility inspection, maintenance, and repair [Worcester 1996]. PWCs work with installa-
tions' staff civil engineer offices; in addition to routine maintenance work and contracting,
they may also provide information systems support or assist in preparation of periodic fa-
cilities reports [Merritt 1996; Stump 1996]. The Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF)
pays their overhead expenses; service fees charged to the supported activities cover the
remainder.
3. Inventory Management
The quantity, value, size, features, age, and status of each building or structure in the
Navy's shore facilities inventory is kept in the Naval Facilities Assets Database (NFADB),
managed by NAVFAC [NAVFAC 1995]. Updated annually as facilities are built, destroyed,
Major Claimants (O&M, N)
BUPERS* Bureau of Naval Personnel
CNO (N09B) Assistant Vice CNO
CNET Chief of Naval Education & Training
LANTFLT CINC, US Atlantic Fleet
METOC Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command
NAVAIR Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
NAVEUR CINC, US Naval Forces Europe
NAVFAC Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NAVSEA Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSUP Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command
NCTC Commander, Naval Computers and Telecommunications Command
PACFLT CINC, US Pacific Fleet
SECGRU Commander, Naval Security Group
SPAWAR Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
SSP Director, Strategic Systems Program
Table 1.1. Major claimants receiving RPM funding from the Operations and Maintenance,
Navy (O&M.N) appropriation. Source: N44 [1995b]. Others receive their RPM funding from
other sources such as DBOF or FH,N; this thesis does not address specifically the apportionment
of appropriations other than 0&M,N. The Navy has created a new administrative fund source
under which BUPERS and some other assets fall, but BUPERS still received O&M.N funding in
1996 and 1997. Major claimants allocate this funding to subordinate activities and installations
for actual performance of maintenance and repair.
renovated, or transferred between maintaining organizations or appropriations, the NFADB
helps installation managers determine what facilities and associated equipment they are
responsible to maintain.
The NFADB incorporates several distinct measures of facility worth. Current plant
value (CPV) represents a facility's estimated current purchase price; it incorporates any
replacement, modernization, or major equipment installation performed. A facility's plant
replacement value (PRV) represents an estimate of what it would cost to replace a facility
using modern construction materials and techniques [Giorgione 1994]. Appraised values
also appear, but are not typically used in budgeting calculations. Hereafter we refer to
plant value in terms of CPV.
In making and assessing budget decisions, OPNAV organizations classify NFADB
CPV data several ways—investment categories (IC) are one of the most important classifi-
cations for budgeting purposes. ICs (see Table 1.2) represent either broad classifications of
Facilities Engineering Support
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Figure 1.3. NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions and Engineering Field Activities. Source:
NAVFAC [1997]. In their public works and planning support role, EFDs and EFAs assist major
claimants by analyzing annual installation reports and performing some of the facility control
and safety inspections at the installations themselves (see Figure 1.2).
facilities by their designated purpose (e.g., berthing facilities) or common types of facilities
expenditures, such as grounds maintenance.
Facilities are also classified by the fund source (appropriation) paying for their main-
tenance and repair; see Figure 1.4. The largest proportion of CPV, and the majority of
funding, falls in the 0&M,N (Operations and Maintenance, Navy) appropriation.
Classification of facilities by using organization and maintaining organization is of-
ten critical to decisions regarding budgeting, demolition or new construction. For each
property record, the NFADB lists the using organization, the organization with mainte-
nance responsibility (these organizations are not always the same), and the major claimant
responsible for providing maintenance funds.
Facility Investment Categories
01 Aviation operational facilities
02 Communication facilities
03 Waterfront operational facilities
04 Other operational facilities
05 Training facilities
06 Aviation maintenance production
07 Shipyard maintenance production
08 Other maintenance production
09 RDT&E
10 POL supply &: storage
11 Ammunition supply &: storage
12 Other supply &: storage
13 Medical facilities
14 Administrative facilities
15 Troop housing & messing
16 Other personnel support services
17 Utilities
18 Real estate &: ground structures
OTHER Emergency service work; grounds maintenance;
non-Navy real property
Table 1.2. Source: CNO [1987b]. Investment categories (ICs) group facilities based on the
functions they perform. They are a principal categorization used annually by OPNAV to report
plant value and maintenance backlog. ICs can be further divided into cost accounts; there are
approximately 110 RPM cost accounts. Cost accounts themselves represent a number of facility
category codes, most precisely describing the type and function of the facility.
4. Facility Inspection and Cost Estimation
A standard inspection program, administered uniformly by NAVFAC and OPNAV,
is in place at each installation. Facility inspectors regularly examine building and facility
components to determine their serviceability. The results, along with projected costs to
correct any deficiencies and an estimate of the year by when the deficiency must be corrected,
are kept in a local database either at the installation's staff civil engineer's office or at the
supporting PWC or PWD. Maintenance activities use the databases to write job orders,
submit reports to the major claimant, provide updates to the NFADB, and construct annual
and long-range maintenance plans extending roughly five years into the future. The Long
Range Maintenance Planning system (LRMP) [Balke and Kruzicki 1990] is a good example
of Navy installation-level inspection and cost estimation information systems.
In the LRMP operations manuals, Balke and Kruzicki [1990] delineate the facilities
maintenance cost estimation procedures followed by PWC Norfolk; we summarize them











Figure 1.4. Department of the Navy (DoN) 1995 current plant value (CPV) by fund source.
The diagram shows the percentage of total DoN CPV maintained by funds from the indicated
appropriation. The largest four are Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M.N); Defense
Business Operating Fund (DBOF); Operations & Maintenance, Marine Corps (O&MMC); and
Family Housing, Navy (FH.N). The total CPV depicted is $137 billion. Source: N44 [1995a].
Inspections are performed by knowledgeable facilities maintenance personnel famil-
iar with structural, mechanical, or electrical systems maintenance and repair. The inspec-
tor identifies new facility deficiencies and re-evaluates known, uncorrected deficiencies from
earlier inspections. For each deficiency identified, the inspector prepares an estimate that
identifies the scope of the project. The estimate specifies a complete work breakdown struc-
ture (Figure 1.5) and provides a bottom-up engineering cost estimate for each task identified
during the inspection. Total cost for completing a task is specified in terms of equipment,
labor, and materials. The LRMP system at PWC Norfolk incorporates a cost estimation
software package that determines the cost of completing a task based on equipment and
materials requirements and labor rates. The inspector further considers special equipment
or accessibility measures required to complete each task, and includes these considerations
9
in the estimate. If the installation or PWC determines that the project must be contracted,
it adds contract costs to the estimate (as percentages of the estimate subtotal); for projects
without an open-end contract, additional fees may be required for contractor bonds or
engineering work.
NAVFAC [1997] describes a standard DoD facilities cost estimation package called
the Construction Criteria Base (CCB), published by the National Institute of Building
Sciences, capable of providing automated engineering cost estimates based on detailed data
regarding a particular maintenance or repair project. It is available, though not currently
in use. It includes the Commercial Unit Price Book (CUPB), which contains detailed
equipment, labor, and materials prices in various portions of the continental US.
Maintenance plans schedule projects based on their relative criticality. Therefore,
projects may not be completed in the same year as their estimates. The scheduled "ac-
complishment year" reflects the inspectors' or engineers' assessment of the remaining life of
the system or component. For example, maintenance activities generally complete work on
systems or components currently in a state of total failure or imminent failure (six months
after inspection) in the current year. A component whose estimated lifetime is 25 years
may function but manifest rapid deterioration when 23 years old; the schedule may dictate
its repair or replacement in its 24th or 25th year at the discretion of the inspection team
or PWC engineering department. Less pressing deficiencies may be scheduled for the third
or fourth year following the inspection. The maintenance plan depicts then-year project
completion costs, requiring that a cost estimate be revised for inflation of labor and ma-
terials costs if the project is not completed on time. PWC Norfolk schedules projects on
a five-year cycle and applies an annual inflation factor of approximately 3% to labor and
materials costs [Balke and Kruzicki 1990].
5. Condition Reporting Systems
The Shore Base Readiness Report (BASEREP) and the Annual Inspection Sum-
mary (AIS) are the two major reports filed by installation commanders. These reports
are complementary. The BASEREP provides qualitative information on the status of an
installation's facilities; its intent is to gain the installation commander's perspective on
how well the shore facilities contribute to the installation's mission readiness [CNO 1987c].
The AIS, a quantitative listing of outstanding facility deficiencies, provides the results of
ongoing facilities evaluations and inspections and the costs to correct the deficiencies in a
particular year [CNO 1987a]. Major claimants collate and analyze installations' reports for



















Figure 1.5. Work breakdown structure for project cost estimates. "Special" projects may
include work on major installed equipment such as elevators or roof cranes. An additional
project type, "Other", may be used to represent projects that do not fall into any of the types
listed. An installation's annual inspection summary (AIS) is a comprehensive list of unfunded
projects remaining as a firm requirement at the end of the year; corresponding total outstanding
costs are obtained by summing the projects' cost estimates computed as shown in the figure.
The AIS is one of the two annual reports used to support RPM budget requests and, therefore,
a principal component of the S&l SPP. Source: Balke and Kruzicki [1990].
The AIS only represents a portion of M&R projects. In order to be reported on
the AIS, a deficiency must cause one of the following conditions if it is not corrected [CNO
1987b]:
• A catastrophic environmental condition.
• A significant safety hazard.
• An unacceptable quality-of-life condition for those living or working at or near
the facility.
• An inability to perform the facility's assigned mission.
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These conditions are called deficiency types; exactly one deficiency type is associated with
each maintenance or repair project. A deficiency type may denote either an existing problem
or one projected to occur by a particular time; the Navy distinguishes these by identifying
"critical" and "deferrable" maintenance projects. If the condition exists or is imminent
(projected to exist within six months of the inspection [Balke and Kruzicki 1990]), the
inspector classifies the project as "critical" and schedules it for accomplishment in the cur-
rent fiscal year. If the condition is not imminent, the inspector classifies the project as
"deferrable" and it is scheduled for accomplishment in a later year, as previously described.
If a deferrable deficiency remains uncorrected at the end of the year identified in the main-
tenance plan, it becomes critical with the associated deficiency type, meaning that it should
be corrected immediately. All uncorrected, critical deficiencies at the end of the year appear
on the AIS as "critical backlog" of maintenance and repair (BMAR). "Deferrable backlog"
represents the total present worth of all deferrable project costs. The detailed portions of
the AIS (the Maintenance and Repair of Real Property (MRRP) Deficiency List and the
Cost Account Summary), not submitted to OPNAV but maintained and used by the major
claimants, fist specific project costs and totals by cost account, respectively [CNO 1987a].
The Navy reports its critical backlog annually to Congress as a measure of facility status
and management efficiency.
Some legitimate maintenance and repair costs are not reportable through the AIS.
These include emergency work, service calls, and maintenance and repair of base con-
struction equipment; they appear largely in IC "OTHER". Managers must predict these
requirements since they largely cannot identify them in the inspection process. Each instal-
lation (or its public works center or detachment) tracks these costs and reports aggregate
figures to the installation and claimant comptrollers. The amount of these expenses varies
considerably by installation depending on the size, usage rates, serviceability of facilities,
staff organization, and method of accomplishing work. At the installation level, managers
view these expenses as "nondiscretionary" because this work is absolutely necessary in or-
der to continue normal daily operations [Shepard and Lord 1996]. Therefore, this category
of M&R work largely cannot be deferred until later years. Deficiencies anticipated to be
funded from special appropriations such as DoD environmental cleanup funds are not fisted
on the AIS, because they do not have to compete for funding from the installations' budgets.
Some major claimants do not submit an AIS at all; OPNAV provides M&R funding largely
based on historical budgets [Worcester 1996].
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6. Priority Systems
In 1989, the CNO published the Shore Facility Life Extension Program (Shore
FLEP) [CNO 1989]. It is based on the premise that shore facilities, like other Navy capital
investments, are costly and represent a considerable maintenance and repair commitment
to maintain or extend their useful life. It also acknowledges that the Navy cannot afford
to maintain its entire shore infrastructure properly. It therefore places a value on facilities
according to the functions they perform: higher priority facilities contribute more to the
Navy's overall operational readiness than lower priority facilities. Commanders and facil-
ities managers place higher priority on M&R requirements for facilities in higher priority
Shore FLEP categories. The categorization appears in Table 1.3.
13
Investment
Facility Purpose Categories Examples
High Priority:
Aviation Operations 01 Air traffic control, ground electronics
Fleet Communication
Operations 02, 04 Microwave links, AUTODLN switching
Port Operations 03, 04 Berthing, pier-side services
Training Services 05 Formal instruction facilities
Bachelor Housing Services 15 Personnel accommodations
Messing Services 15, 16 Dining facilities
Utility Operations 17 Power, steam, water, sewage
Security Services 04,
18
16, 17, Law enforcement, physical security
Medium Priority:
Aircraft Maintenance 06, 08 Maintenance facilities
Ship Repair Services 07 Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities
POL Products/Services 04, 10 Fuel storage and distribution
Ordnance Services 04, 08, 11 Weapons and ammunition storage
Medical Services 08, 13 Hospitals, clinics, sanitation
Dental Services 08, 13 Dental clinics
Personal Services 04, 16 Personnel administration; chapels
Family Housing Services 16, 20 Family housing; housing referral
Low Priority:
Special Base Operations 02, 04, 08 Oceanography, intelligence
Operational Systems
Engineering 08 Calibration services, in-service testing




08, 10, Supply administration & storage
Corrections 16 Brigs, secure detention facilities
Administrative Services 14 Legal services, postal facilities
Information Services 04, 14 Automated data processing
Public Works Services 04, 08, 10, Inspection & repair; grounds maintenance;
17, 18 hazardous materials services
Fire Protection 16 Fire stations
Base Transportation 04, 08, 18 Roads, rail networks, motor pools
Base Communications 02 Base telephone services
Table 1.3. Shore Facility Life Extension Program priorities. Source: CNO [1989]. Investment
categories may appear in more than one priority category because they are specified here in
terms of their subordinate cost accounts and facility category codes. Facility inspection data
and maintenance costs are available at this level of detail in the MRRP Deficiency Lists submitted
annually to the major claimants.
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II. RELATED RESEARCH
A. OPTIMIZING CAPITAL BUDGETING DECISIONS
Organizations frequently must decide how to allocate funds, over time, among a
number of competing requirements. When the requirements can be sufficiently characterized
in terms of their respective cash flows, and any mutual dependencies clearly defined, a wide
range of proven optimization techniques can be applied. The typical objective is to maximize
the net present value (NPV) of returns accruing from a portfolio of investments or projects,
subject to budget constraints and various other restrictions. Optimization techniques have
been developed also to handle cases in which multiple objectives exist or even those in which
an objective can only be defined implicitly [Rosenthal 1985]. Interpretation of "target"
resource levels as absolute requirements may, in a particular instance of an optimization
model, either preclude a feasible solution or limit the quality of the solution attained in an
undesirable way. Implementation of "elastic" constraints (e.g., Brown, Clemence, Teufert,
and Wood [1991]) helps resolve these difficulties in a consistent manner.
Weingartner [1963] is a standard reference for the formulation of capital budgeting
problems using linear and integer programming. Clark, Hindelang, and Pritchard [1989]
define several generic capital budgeting problems and examine the application of linear,
integer, and goal programming techniques to their solution. These texts explain in detail
most of the techniques used in the models we describe in the remainder of this section.
Bradley [1986] formulates a large-scale, mixed integer linear program to determine
an optimal portfolio of investments for GTE. The model, termed the Capital Program
Management System (CPMS) optimizer, evaluates candidate project cash flows to deter-
mine optimal levels of investment in projects over time. Several key design features are
prototypical of this class of models and apply directly to the Navy RPM problem. The
CPMS optimizer relieves managers from tedious quantitative evaluation of many alterna-
tives so that they can apply their time and judgement to non-quantifiable tasks such as
long range planning and restructuring, development of alternatives, and other key aspects
of the broader decision context. The model considers short-term restrictions and long-
term objectives simultaneously, often making minor modifications to the former in order to
achieve significant improvement—otherwise impossible—in the latter. This tradeoff can be
justified based on the economic principle of marginal cost [Rosenthal 1985; Bradley 1986],
and is a feature common to the other optimization models discussed below. As a result of
implementing the model, GTE's management has much greater visibility of the investment
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decisions made at subordinate telephone operating companies by gathering more informa-
tion at top management levels. This enables GTE to evaluate investment alternatives and
examine specific tradeoffs relatively quickly [Bradley 1986].
Brown, Clemence, Teufert, and Wood [1991] formulate an optimization model to
modernize Army helicopter assets. The model, PHOENIX, considers both procurement
costs as well as support, operating, and retirement costs in determining what assets to
buy, upgrade, or retire, and when each such action should be taken. Constraining factors
include program budgets, production schedules, and required mixes of aircraft types. The
primary characteristic of PHOENIX useful in the context of the real property maintenance
budgeting problem is its ability to recommend modifications to the annual program bud-
gets to achieve economically sensible budget targets over time, accomplished with elastic
constraints. PHOENIX, however, models a problem largely unlike facilities maintenance
and repair. It is a mixed integer linear program that makes "buy or don't buy" decisions
regarding single investment projects with enormous individual costs; its procurement de-
cisions assume full commitment of operations and support costs; and it models specific
industrial processes (e.g., production fines) not specifically encountered in facilities mainte-
nance management.
Two mixed integer linear programs developed at the Naval Postgraduate School
provide useful insights for capital budgeting optimization models. Free [1994] develops a
model to schedule Army base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions based on projected
costs and resultant savings. It is similar to PHOENIX and CPMS in that its decisions incur
large, indivisible expenses at different points in time, and it incorporates elastic budget
constraints to allow a sensible tradeoff between short-term budgets and long-term savings
from the BRAC process. It is especially relevant in the context of this thesis because it
demonstrates the successful application of capital budgeting optimization models to DoD
infrastructure decisions: In 1994, its proposed schedule achieved a 34% higher BRAC savings
($223 million) than the original manual schedule submitted to the BRAC commission [Free
1994].
Carr [1996] formulates a model to help the Ballistic Missile Defense Office develop an
annual procurement strategy for theater missile defense systems. In modeling the character-
istics of an optimal multi-year procurement plan, Carr develops the concept of a "continued
debt penalty" that balances the long-term gain realized from exceeding a particular budget
to a dollar equivalent borrowing cost, and carries over indebtedness from year to year [Carr
1996]. This concept is important to the development of the Navy RPM model described
here.
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Each of these models recommends specific actions to be taken at different future
times, and spends future budget dollars based on past, present, and future actions and
requirements. As a result, each relies strongly on cost estimation and projection. Clark et
al. [1989] devote a chapter to emphasizing the need for forecasting future requirements and
understanding the assumptions inherent in the forecasting methods. The CPMS optimizer's
success as a planning tool for GTE depended on the meticulate analysis of alternatives and
careful prediction of available budgets [Bradley 1986]. The PHOENIX modelers divided
themselves into a modeling team and a data development team; the latter devoted their
efforts largely to accurate determination and categorization of the numerous costs incurred
in helicopter procurement and overhaul [Brown, Clemence, Teufert and Wood 1991, pp. 43-
45]. Free [1994] used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) cost estimation model
to provide input to the optimization model; Carr [1996] used fundamental parametric cost
estimation procedures to determine and apply production learning effects, cost overruns,
and schedule overruns. The Navy faces a similar cost projection problem in managing its
RPM budget because its inspection program cannot identify all of the requirements that
accrue over the time horizon considered, and because not all of the major claimants receiving
RPM funds submit inspection results.
B. MODELS FOR FACILITIES MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
Models developed specifically for public sector facilities M&R also rely on some
mechanism to project either future costs or future facility condition [Neely, Neathammer
and Stirn 1991; Golabi, Kulkarni and Way 1982; Madanat, Karlaftis and McCarthy 1997;
Lind 1995; Falk and McCormick 1983]. Many also incorporate optimization techniques to
minimize a measure of net cost [Golabi, Kulkarni and Way 1982], maximize a subjectively
derived benefit function [Lind 1995], or maximize a measure of asset value [Falk and Mc-
Cormick 1983]. Models used as facilities M&R budgeting decision tools typically address
a timeline of several years and integrate dynamically the effects of successive decisions on
total work requirements, facility condition, and budget requirements [Golabi, Kulkarni and
Way 1982; Falk and McCormick 1983]. This section describes several such models, their
forecasting techniques, and an appraisal of their suitability for the Navy RPM budgeting
problem.
1. US Army Models
The US Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory developed a bud-
geting decision aid called the Maintenance Resource Prediction Model (MRPM) [Neely,
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Neathammer and Stirn 1991]. The model consists of an extensive cost database and a series
of database access programs designed to help Army organizations predict M&R costs for
a specific set of facilities. The costs reflect the M&R tasks the research team determined
should be performed for a particular facility based on its type of construction, components,
installed equipment, age, and other specifications, in order to keep the facility in a satisfac-
tory condition. The MRPM calculates costs for performance of each task from the specific
material and labor requirements corresponding to the task, and from time and cost factors
maintained by the Army. The model assumes that the maintaining organization covers
equipment costs, e.g., trucks, ladders, etc., separately. If properly maintained and man-
aged, the MRPM could be an effective tool in the accurate determination of operating and
support costs corresponding to candidate projects in the military construction program.
However, the MRPM data reflect the construction technology, equipment, and materials
in use at Army installations in the 1980s and would require constant updating for effec-
tive use. Further, the basic research concludes that condition assessment programs are too
expensive. Since the data assume that the facilities being maintained are always kept in
a satisfactory condition, the MRPM cannot assess the deferred costs of failing to provide
required funding.
The Army currently uses a facilities condition reporting system called the Instal-
lation Status Report (ISR) [United States Military Academy 1993]. It is a distributed
information management system designed to provide Army-wide visibility of facility quan-
tity and quality relative to uniformly established standards. The reports group facilities
into five ISR areas and approximately 200 facility category groups (FCGs). The condition
( "quality" ) of facilities in each of the ISR areas and FCGs are rated as either "green" (meets
standards), "amber" (fails to meet standards but is operational), or "red" (fails to meet
standards and poses hazards or obstacles to proper utilization). The quantity of facilities
is measured as a percentage of the total size (physical area) requirement. Quality and
quantity assessments are combined to rate facilities on a scale of CI (best) to C4 (worst),
with non-evaluated facilities falling into an administrative category (C5). The ISR software
identifies three possible remedial actions (sustainment, renovation, and new construction)
to correct for deficiencies in quality and quantity, and computes the cost of remedial actions
on a per-unit-area basis. The resulting costs are shown as a requirement of the installation
or Major Army Command (MACOM; roughly equivalent to a Navy major claimant) over
a period of five years.
The ISR provides only information, and currently does not incorporate an allocation
methodology. Lind [1995] proposes a method for making budget decisions regarding facilities
at the installation, MACOM, and Headquarters, Department of the Army levels based on
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the ISR and associated costs. The method determines the decisionmakers' goals for their
organizations, and explains how to relate ISR areas and FCGs to goals by estimating the
relative importance of each type of facilities to the achievement of each goal. A set of
linear programs allocate M&R funds at each level of the hierarchy to maximize a measure
of benefit derived from the facility weights.
The Army's approach to installation M&R funding is not suitable for direct ap-
plication to the Navy. While the Army directly ties discrete levels of facility quantity
and condition to costs required to upgrade the facilities to Cl status, the Navy does not.
BASEREP shows similar discrete levels of facility quantity and condition (C1-C4), but
does not contain cost data. The Navy does not consider construction requirements (facility
quantity) to be pertinent to M&R needs, so it addresses quantity deficiencies and costs sep-
arately through the MILCON process. Finally, the Army does not have a standard priority
system linking facility condition with operational readiness similar to Shore FLEP. Lind's
model would elicit equivalent information from decisionmakers separately at each level of
the management hierarchy.
2. Probabilistic Infrastructure Deterioration Models
Another class of models (e.g., Madanat, Karlaftis, and McCarthy [1997]) deals with
discrete facility condition ratings and is relatively well developed in the literature. Perhaps
the best known of these models is a decision support system developed for the Arizona
Department of Transportation [Golabi, Kulkarni and Way 1982; Wang and Zaniewski 1996].
This model, called the Network Optimization System (NOS), provides the least cost annual
M&R recommendations to keep the Arizona road network in a satisfactory condition. In
the model's first year, when Arizona maintained a road network with a PRV in excess of $6
billion, it saved over $14 million in M&R costs. The initial version of the model identified
120 distinct road conditions and 17 alternative maintenance actions, and used regression
analysis with Arizona's extensive historical condition data to determine the probability of a
road segment deteriorating from one condition to another one year after the application of
one (or none) of the seventeen maintenance actions. The prediction part of the model uses
these transition probabilities to construct a discrete-time Markov chain (e.g., Feller [1957]
and Ross [1993]) with a one-year time step; the optimization part is a linear program that
minimizes total discounted costs corresponding to maintenance actions over a finite time
horizon.
Two successful outcomes of implementing NOS were: (1) The state legislature be-
came more receptive to budget requests, because NOS not only developed mimmal-cost
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maintenance programs, but it also provided expected road conditions corresponding to dif-
ferent budget levels [Golabi, Kulkarni and Way 1982, pp. 17-18]; and (2) Arizona Depart-
ment of Transportation headquarters gained a greater degree of control over the condition
of roads statewide. Prior to the implementation of NOS, district managers submitted their
own budget requests regardless of needs elsewhere in the state. With the ability to prioritize
and balance requirements on a statewide basis, the Arizona Department of Transportation
was able to select specific maintenance actions that, though not necessarily the best for each
individual road segment, ensured a least-cost maintenance policy for the entire highway sys-
tem by "considering the costs versus benefits of all actions in the context of short-term and
long-term standards, and current road conditions" [Golabi, Kulkarni and Way 1982, p. 17].
Implementation or modification of NOS for Navy RPM funding allocation is not
currently feasible. Navy facilities include not only roads but numerous other types of
buildings and structures requiring many different types of corrective actions. Though the
BASEREP does provide discrete condition ratings (Cl through C4, like the Army system),
they are largely qualitative in nature and are not explicitly linked to M&R actions or costs.
Another concern raised by Madanat, Karlaftis and McCarthy [1997] is that the assumptions
required to implement Markov deterioration models do not hold for certain types of facilities
(their research examined bridge decks), and other prediction methods are required.
3. Maintenance and Repair Optimization
Falk and McCormick [1983] present an optimization model that maximizes a measure
of capital asset value by applying manpower and M&R budgets over time. The model is
dynamic; i.e., it relates maintenance backlog and asset value in one period, t, to their values
in the previous period, t — 1, modified by the resources applied in period t (these constraints
typically are called inventory balance relationships). These types of constraints are useful
and appear in current Navy RPM models (discussed in the next section) as well as the model
developed in this thesis (presented in the next chapter). The model assumes that annual
M&R requirements are proportional to the previous year's asset value. It also introduces
several premises that do not hold for the Navy. Foremost, the model's budget levels increase
over time. Assets can be purchased in any period, and a fixed proportion are retired in each
period; total assets decrease over time if the maintenance requirements generally exceed
available funding. A single budget funds asset procurement and M&R. Further, the asset
value being maximized does not depend on asset condition: M&R requirements only exist
to consume a portion of the budget, and lack of funding does not affect the performance of
assets on hand. The model represents a single organization's decisions and does not require
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the apportionment of M&R funds among subordinate organizations or specific projects.
Finally, it considers a finite horizon, which may or may not lead to an optimal set of
decisions. For example, it is not clear that the model's decisions over a four year horizon
would also be optimal for the first four years of a five year horizon. This phenomenon is
known as "end effects" (e.g., Walker and Dell [1995]).
C. NAVY REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE MODELS
Giorgione [1994], expanding on the results of a Department of Defense (DoD) report
to Congress [DoD 1989], surveys numerous public and private organizations with facilities
M&R programs in place, and distills three common methods of determining facilities' M&R
requirements and budgeting for them. Based on the relative advantages and disadvantages
of each, he recommends a method for the Navy to use (which it currently does).
• Historical budgeting adjusts the current year's budget for inflation, and perhaps
other, subjective factors, and recommends it again for the following year. These
methods perpetuate program funding inequities, produce budgets unrelated to
actual requirements, and cannot be applied in a stable or decreasing budget
environment.
• Formula budgeting refers to a family of models that use one or more explanatory
("driver") variables to determine M&R costs statistically. These variables may
include PRV or CPV, number of personnel supported, physical area of the facil-
ities, energy consumption rates, average facility age, and types or functions of
facilities. The primary advantages of these methods are simplicity of calculation
and flexibility in selection of the type and number of cost drivers. The disad-
vantages are that the resulting budgets do not depend directly on actual facility
condition, and that the models must be updated to reflect changing construction
technologies, facility inventories, and M&R techniques.
• Zero-based budgeting refers to bottom-up requirements determination, as op-
posed to top-down requirements estimation. Development of a zero-based budget
starts with determination of management's goals and then proceeds to prioritize
requirements relative to the goals in order to determine an itemized budget.
The advantages of this method are that it links budget actions to organizational
goals, and produces a budget that directly addresses specific requirements. Gior-
gione concludes that this procedure is not feasible for the Navy, because it would
require excessive manpower and time to gather data and analyze it properly.
Giorgione recommends that a formula method be used to predict outyear M&R re-
quirements, but that base year requirements be established at the level of reported BMAR.
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This approach suggests the form of the model should resemble an inventory balance rela-
tionship, where BMAR in successive years depends on its value in previous years and on
budgets and requirements in the intervening years. Mathtech [1991] and Ackerman, Choi,
and Weis [1995] develop two such models, which can be implemented in a spreadsheet for
fast "what-if" analyses of M&R budgets at the OPNAV level. Several other organizations
including NAVFAC have developed very similar models; a collection of them are currently
in use at N4.
These models have several shortcomings. They do not provide the ability to allocate
funding, based on the Shore FLEP or any priority system, to the major claimants. It is not
possible to perform manual tradeoff analyses for different claimant budget levels, because
model coefficients corresponding to each major claimant do not exist. Additionally, these
models do not incorporate an optimization technique, so they cannot weigh one subordinate
organization's requirements against another in attempting to reach a Service-wide goal. The
model developed in this thesis can address these shortcomings.
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III. A MODEL FOR NAVY RPM BUDGET ALLOCATION
The primary function missing from the RPM budgeting models currently used by
OPNAV is allocation. That is, these models predict BMAR over a number of years given
total funding, but do not assist in determining how to apportion the funding among major
claimants to best satisfy the Navy's priorities. This chapter presents a linear programming
model, OMAR (Optimization of Maintenance and Repair), to determine multi-year funding
levels for the major claimants receiving 0&M,N funding for the maintenance and repair of
real property, with the following objectives:
• Reduce both critical and deferrable backlog at each major claimant and in each
priority category to specified annual levels.
• Minimize net present value (NPV) of total additional costs incurred by deferring
projects.
• Prevent unmanageably large swings ("funding turbulence") in claimant budget
levels from year to year.
These objectives can conflict with one another. Measures of funding turbulence and target
levels of backlog are subjective and require specific management interpretation. Character-
ization of a solution as "optimal" in this setting is vague. For these reasons, we present
OMAR as a tool to achieve solutions to the budgeting and allocation problem that, in some
sense, "best satisfy" basic management goals.
A. SCOPE OF MODEL DECISIONS
OMAR allocates approximately 92% of major claimant 0&M,N RPM funding (1995
figures). Minor construction projects constitute 7%; they do not contribute to BMAR nor
specifically address the correction of maintenance or repair deficiencies reported in the AIS.
Another 1% is earmarked for the major claimants who maintain relatively small physical
plants and do not submit AIS reports.
B. THE TIME HORIZON
The decisionmaker's time horizon is a fixed input quantity—nominally the six years
of the POM. OMAR considers years beyond the final year of the POM because the pro-
cesses being modeled actually extend indefinitely, and optimization models can exploit an
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artificially-imposed finite horizon unrealistically. The formulation presented in this chapter
has an infinite time horizon. Two finite horizon approximations (primal equilibrium and
dual equilibrium) appear in Appendix B, and help produce solutions free of end effects in
accordance with procedures developed by Walker [1995] and Walker and Dell [1995].
C. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The prospective use of the model at OPNAV, as well as the quantity and scale of
the input data, require several simplifying assumptions.
• Any fraction of an individual project can be completed by providing an equiva-
lent fraction of its cost.
• Major claimants apportion their funding to installations in order to complete
projects, ultimately with the same net effect envisioned by the model. MRRP
funding allocated by the model does not "migrate" to cover other 0&:M,N ex-
penses nor is it augmented from other categories of 0&M,N.
• Maintenance and repair requirements, except for those comprising the base year
BMAR, are known a fixed number of years in advance through the inspection
process.
• For each year a project is unfunded, its completion cost increases in real terms
by a factor < d < 1.
• MRRP deficiency lists detail individual unfunded projects by investment cate-
gory, cost account, and facility category code; separate critical and deferrable
projects; and provide a scheduled accomplishment year. These data allow ex-
plicit funding prioritization by Shore FLEP priority level. Accomplishment year
data are available at the installation level but are not normally collected by the
major claimants, EFDs or EFAs. We therefore assume that OPNAV can obtain
them in a data collection effort augmenting the annual reporting process.
• MRRP funding in excess of the prescribed annual budget is only available by
taking it from other appropriations or 0&;M,N programs. This money is bor-
rowed at a fixed nominal interest rate and compounded annually; any amount
may be repaid in subsequent years.
• Major claimants and installations can predict or know in advance the "nondis-
cretionary" or "cost of ownership" costs associated with standing job orders,
emergency work, and service calls.
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D. ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL
This section defines requisite sets and indices, data elements, decision variables, and elastic
variables, followed by the model formulation. Indices and data appear throughout in lower
case; variables are in upper case.
1. Sets and Indices
• c major claimants directly receiving 0&M,N funding (LANTFLT, PACFLT, NAVSEA,
NCTC,
...);
• i investment category (IC) (01, 02, ..., 18; OTHER);
• p priority category (high, medium, low);
• t fiscal years (1,2,..
.);
• x set of ICs pertaining to AIS-reportable deficiencies (01, 02, ..., 18); and




• budgett total MRRP budget estimate for fiscal year t (FY t thousands of dollars);
• cbwtcp dollar-equivalent penalty for each dollar of priority p critical backlog remaining
above the target level at claimant c;
• d rate annual project costs increase due to deterioration (0 < d < 1);
• dbwtcp dollar-equivalent penalty for each dollar of priority p deferrable backlog remaining
above the target level at claimant c;
• defercxpt thousands of dollars of maintenance and repair at claimant c, deferrable in
year zero, that become critical if uncorrected at the end of year t in IC x of
priority p (year t thousands of dollars);
• A tt ' conversion factor from year t dollars to year t' dollars, where t and t' are both within
the real planning horizon;
• endccpt desired level of critical backlog at claimant c of priority p deficiencies at the end
of fiscal year t (year t thousands of dollars);
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• enddCpt desired level of deferrable backlog at claimant c of priority p deficiencies at the
end of fiscal year t (year t thousands of dollars)
;
• 7 approximation of A^-i in years beyond the current planning horizon;
• nondiscretct required funding for non-AIS-reportable deficiencies such as standing job
orders, emergency work, and service calls at claimant c in fiscal year t (year t
thousands of dollars);
• nturwtc dollar-equivalent penalty per dollar reduction in total MRRP funding of claimant
c from one year to the next below desired lower bound of variation;
• pturwtc dollar-equivalent penalty per dollar increase in total MRRP funding of claimant
c from one year to the next above desired upper bound of variation;
• r inflation-free annual interest rate to borrow funds in excess of established budget levels;
• startblogcxp critical backlog at the beginning of the first year of priority p deficiencies at
claimant c in IC x (year zero thousands of dollars);
• startfundc year zero MRRP funding for claimant c (year zero thousands of dollars);
• To final year of decision horizon; and
• vary
,
vary lower and upper bounds for acceptable year-to-year variation in claimants'
MRRP funding levels, expressed as a percentage of the recommended annual
budget.
3. Decision Variables
• BMARcxpt value of priority p critical backlog at claimant c, IC x at the end of year t
(year t thousands of dollars)
;
• DWcxypt value in year t of all remaining priority p deferrable work at claimant c, IC x
becoming critical in exactly y years (year t thousands of dollars);
• FCcxpt year t funding at claimant c for existing critical deficiencies in IC x, priority p
(year t thousands of dollars); and
• FDdypt year t funding at claimant c for deficiencies in IC i and priority p applied to




• CBDEVcpt priority p critical backlog at claimant c at the end of fiscal year t in excess
of endccpt (year t thousands of dollars);
• DBDEVcpt priority p deferrable backlog at claimant c at the end of fiscal year t in excess
of enddcpt (year t thousands of dollars);
• LBt balance of "loan" from other appropriations or programs in year t (year t thousands
of dollars)
;
• NTURBct decrease in dollars allocated to claimant c in fiscal year t below vary% of the
previous year's funding (year t thousands of dollars); and
• PTURBct increase in dollars allocated to claimant c in fiscal year t above vary% of the
previous year's funding (year t thousands of dollars).
5. Formulation
Minimize
To-l / Jfc \ oo / k \
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LB = 0. (3.2)
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Constraints (3.2) set initial BMAR to levels reported in the AIS, and start the initial
loan balance at zero.
Constraints (3.3) and (3.4) are inventory balance constraints for BMAR, as discussed
in Chapter II. They require BMAR in year t equal BMAR in year t — 1, plus proportional
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costs associated with deterioration and inflation, plus deferrable backlog scheduled to be
accomplished by the end of year t but not yet funded, less funding applied in year t to
correct critical deficiencies.
Constraints (3.5) and (3.6) prescribe annual target levels for BMAR and deferrable
backlog, respectively, for each claimant and priority category. The variables CBDEV^t
and DBDEVcpt allow backlog to exceed the target levels at linear cost.
Constraints (3.7-3.11) are inventory balance constraints for deferrable backlog, cate-
gorized by claimant, IC, accomplishment year, and priority category. The model aggregates
all projects in the deferrable backlog sharing this categorization and may pay portions of
their cost at any time prior to their accomplishment year. Unpaid portions are augmented
annually by inflation and by deterioration costs. The portion unpaid at the end of the
accomplishment year is added to BMAR as part of constraints (3.3) and (3.4).
Constraints (3.12) and (3.13) are annual MRRP budget constraints. They show the
implementation of Carr's "continued debt penalty" (see §IIA). If year t expenditures exceed
the prescribed budget, the excess adds to year t's loan balance accruing interest annually
at rate r. Conversely, if year t expenditures are below the prescribed budget, the excess
goes toward any loan balance. The objective function, (3.1), discourages borrowing. The
rate r is an "inflation-free" annual interest rate [Thuesen and Fabrycky 1988]; by contrast,
a market interest rate expresses the escalation of a cash flow from the effects of interest
and inflation in a single rate. The two rates provide equivalent methods of comparing cash
flows over time: "actual-dollar" analysis requires use of the market interest rate; "constant-
dollar" analysis requires the inflation-free rate. For example, $1 at the beginning of year t
has value $(1 +r)(l +i) at the beginning of year t + 1 when the inflation-free annual interest
rate is r and the inflation rate is i. An equivalent market interest rate i' would compute
the value in year t + 1 to be $(1 + z'); in other words, i r = r + i + ri. The inflation-free rate
is convenient for OMAR, because OPNAV frequently uses the 0&M,N inflation factors to
perform analyses in constant-dollar terms.
Constraints (3.14) specify that year t funding may not be used to fund "cost of
ownership" activities, such as service calls or emergency work, in any year t' > t.
Constraints (3.15) require that funding allocated to claimant c in year t must meet
or exceed projected costs of nonreportable, "nondiscretionary" M&R.
Constraints (3.16-3.18) prevent wide swings in claimant funding levels from year to
year, limiting the total year t funding at claimant c to between vary percent and vary
percent of the previous year's funding. The variables NTURBct and PTURBct allow
variation in excess of the specified limits, at linear cost.
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The objective function (3.1) minimizes the sum of: NPV of annual costs incurred
by deferring critical and deferrable backlog; penalties for failing to meet annual goals for
critical and deferrable backlog; penalties for year-to-year turbulence in claimant funding
levels; and "interest" debts incurred by exceeding prescribed annual budgets. The cost of
deferring projects is represented by modeling "deterioration" as a d-percent real annual
increase in project cost.
E. SPECIFYING MANAGERIAL GOALS
During the development of the model, Worcester [1996] articulated a number of
managerial concerns regarding the planning, programming and assessment of MRRP fund-
ing. The main objectives of the model, stated at the outset of the chapter, address most of
these concerns. The planning and programming processes further require that the model
possess two additional capabilities not present in the models currently used. The first of
these is the ability to prioritize reduction of critical and deferrable backlog in consonance
with the Navy's readiness concerns through the funding process. The second is the ability
to examine the proposed funding levels and propose adjustments based on consistent and
economically sound criteria. The preceding formulation incorporates these concerns by al-
lowing measured violation of constraints such as annual backlog levels or annual budgets,
commensurate with judgement regarding the type of projects that are deferred or funded
as a result. The user must quantify this judgement by setting the parameters r, cbwtcp ,
dbwtcp , pturbc , and nturbc ; there are many methods to do this. This section presents one
systematic approach that ensures: (1) penalties incurred in the model represent concrete
dollar-equivalent quantities, related in a sensible way; and (2) the model enforces consistent,
rational tradeoffs based on the information provided.
1. Quantifying Shore FLEP Priorities
The model parameters cbwtcp and dbwtcp reflect the relative weight that OPNAV
places on facility condition at each claimant, in each priority category. The relative im-
portance of priority categories p does not change from claimant to claimant, because it is
established by OPNAV directive [CNO 1989]. A typical way to model this relative impor-
tance is by assigning to each p a numeric weight wp 6 (0, 1) such that ^Zp wp = 1. Because
the priority categories reflect, by definition, the relative importance of facilities in each
category to the overall operational readiness of the Navy, a set of weights wp represents a
quantitative statement that category q is wq/wp times as important to operational readiness
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as category p. These kinds of statements are difficult to assess outright and a wealth of de-
cision analytic methods (e.g., Srinivasan and Shocker [1973], Saaty [1980], Horsky and Rao
[1984], Cook and Kress [1991], and Marshall and Oliver [1995]) have been developed to help
make them. With only three attributes being compared, it would be feasible to select any
set of weights wp satisfying the requirements above and adjust them until reasonable model
output resulted. The LINPAC (linear programming of preference comparisons) method of
Horsky and Rao [1984] appears in Appendix A as a more structured approach.
2. Quantifying the Desire to Reduce Backlog
OPNAV desires to set annual target levels of critical and deferrable backlog. These
targets appear in constraints (3.5) and (3.6). When year t funding is unable to achieve the
target levels of backlog, the variables CBDEVcpt and DBDEVcpt represent the gap. An
increase in year t funding, effectively by "borrowing" the money from other programs, is
required to close this gap. A reasonable way to measure the relative importance of critical
and deferrable backlog is to equate their reduction with the cost of borrowing the amount
required. The interest rate r represents a notional inflation-free annual interest rate charged
for these additional funds. A loan obtained in this way can be repaid in full at the end
of m years with a repayment of $(1 + r)m per dollar borrowed; the total interest paid
is $(1 + r)m — 1 per dollar. This cost is explicitly minimized in the objective function.
However, using this $1 to pay for critical backlog would improve the objective function by
d + cbwtcp, provided CBDEVcpt > (the target level for critical backlog at claimant c and
priority category p is not being met). The tradeoff between borrowing additional funds
and incurring a penalty for failing to meet backlog goals can be established by specifying a
number of years mc (mp) over which a claimant c borrows to reduce critical (deferrable)
backlog for facilities of priority p:
d + cbwtcp = (l+r)mc -l;
d + dbwtCp = (l + r)mD -l. (3.19)
If |C| and |"P| represent the number of claimants and priority categories considered by the
model, then a total of \C\ x 17*1 borrowing periods would have to be specified. A simpler
approach would be to assess an average proportion of claimant CPV in a given priority
category, e.g., high, and weight priority categories as described above. Only two borrowing
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periods must then be specified, one each for critical and deferrable backlog associated with
high priority facilities. This can be accomplished by requiring first that
- +HI?5^fc - CI + rr-1. (3-20)
where the subscript H denotes high priority, \C\ denotes the number of claimants, CPVcp
denotes current plant value at claimant c of priority p, and Ac and A# are dimensionless
constants to be determined from (3.20) based on choices of mc and mp for critical and
deferrable backlog, respectively. Individual weights can then be determined from
, , .
CPVcH
cbwtcp = XcWp———— and
l^p ^ " vcp
dbwtCp = XDwp p . (3.21)
l^p ^rVcp
Equations (3.21) cause the model to favor claimants with higher proportions of CPV in
high priority facility categories, but only provided significant backlog exists for those facil-
ities. They also ensure that willingness to borrow additional funds for particular kinds of
backlogged projects is directly related to the relative importance OPNAV attaches to the
projects' respective facility priority categories, represented by the weights wp . It is possible
that cbwt
c iow > cbwtc , j^p-h if claimant c has a much larger proportion of high priority
facilities than claimant c', but this does not occur with current CPV data (see Appendix
D, Table D.l) and the weights determined in Appendix A.
3. Quantifying the Desire to Avoid Funding Turbulence
Constraints (3.16-3.18) are included in the model for two primary reasons. First,
large inflows or outflows of MRRP funding can be detrimental to a major claimant's ability
to perform effective maintenance and maintenance planning. Second, without them, the
linear program is free to recommend spending unusually large portions of annual funding
at a small number of major claimants in one year, and elsewhere the next year. The
resulting decisions satisfy the basic requirements but are unusual and largely infeasible
from a management perspective.
The variables NTURBct and PTURBct measure violation of these constraints: they
incur proportional costs via the per-unit penalties pturwt c and nturwtc . Qualitatively, the
costs incurred by an unduly large budget increase should be offset by the corresponding re-
duction in M&R backlog; conversely, the savings realized by a large budget decrease should
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be offset by the corresponding increase in unfunded M&R requirements. The exact val-
ues of the penalties are largely discretionary, because the assessment that a given set of
funding levels demonstrates excessive turbulence is largely a subjective one. The penalties
can be adjusted more easily than those already described in order to obtain satisfactory
recommendations from the model; but reasonable initial values can be obtained directly.
One method for determining them is to assess the relative importance of staying within
reasonable funding limits with respect to the importance of reducing critical backlog asso-
ciated with high priority facilities. Increasing or decreasing the claimant funding limits is
nominally less important; the turbulence weights can be expressed as percentages P+ and
P-
,
respectively, of the critical backlog weights:
pturwtc = P+ cbwtCH',
nturwtc = P-dbwtcu- (3.22)
This method penalizes under- or over-funding a claimant without regard to the claimant's
total CPV or level of backlog. If these factors are important to the allowable funding
turbulence, the user can adjust the allowable turbulence, vary and vary, to compensate.
The next chapter presents an implementation ofOMAR with the data the Navy used
to develop POM 1998 RPM funding levels. It examines the sensitivity of the model's results
to several key assumptions and parameter values, and compares the funding allocated to





This chapter describes OMAR's allocation of MRRP funding over eight years, 1996
to 2003, based on total available funding and AIS reports provided by the Director, Fa-
cilities Engineering Division (N442) for model evaluation purposes. These data appear in
Appendix D. The analyses here are not intended to address a specific planning, program-
ming, or budgeting need, but instead to demonstrate the model's performance under a
number of scenarios. Difficulties in collection of the data required by the model appearing
in the previous chapter lead to minor changes in the formulation; the specific problems
and resulting reformulation appear in the next section. We subsequently compare OMAR
recommendations with the Navy's actual decisions on the bases of total annual MRRP
funding and allocation of the POM budget to 11 major claimants who both receive 0&M,N
funding for MRRP and submit AIS reports. The chapter concludes with an examination of
the model's sensitivity to the borrowing rate, outyear budgets, willingness to borrow, and
claimant underreporting of requirements.
A. DATA AVAILABILITY AND REFORMULATION
AIS reports forwarded to OPNAV do not contain individual project information;
they contain critical and deferrable backlog data aggregated by investment category and
claimant. Therefore, information about maintenance and repair requirements by priority
category p is largely unavailable at OPNAV. The effects of this problem can be mitigated
substantially, because most investment categories are dominated by facilities in a single
priority category. It is possible to place an implicit value on high, medium, and low priority
facilities maintained by each claimant by computing a weighted average of CPV by claimant
and investment category using the original weights cbwtcp and dbwtcp described in Chapter
III. OMAR can then weight both critical and deferrable backlog by claimant and investment
category, instead of by claimant and facility priority:
, ,
E cbwtcpCPVcxp
cbwtcx = ;and (4.1)





Other parameters required to quantify judgment remain unchanged from those appearing
in Chapter III. Removal of the priority category indices p throughout the remainder of the
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model produces the following reformulation; definitions of index sets, data elements, and
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B. TOTAL FUNDING AND ALLOCATION: 1996-2003
1. Data Sources
The Director, Facilities and Engineering Division (N442) provided nine years of
MRRP funding data for 16 major claimants (see Appendix D). The most recent AIS reports
available were those corresponding to fiscal year 1995. Expenditure totals for IC OTHER,
shown in the appendix by claimant, are used to represent a constant annual expense for
each claimant in years 1996-2003.
Of the 16 major claimants the Navy funded from 0&M,N in 1996-2003. those for
whom AIS reports were not available (NAVSUP, SPAWAR, OTHER and NAVSECGRU)
are not considered within OMAR and receive the MRRP annual budgets as they appear
in Appendix D, Table D.6. BUPERS submitted a 1995 AIS but is not considered in the
model because its primary fund source has changed; its allocation for 1996 and 1997 are
not represented in the total budgets available to OMAR.
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The model uses the 0&M,N inflation factors through 2003 to convert year t dollars
to year t' dollars. For years beyond 2003, they are approximated by an annual inflation rate
of 2.19% (7 = 1/1.0219 = 0.9786).
2. Basic Assumptions
The following parameters reflect a baseline set of judgements used to determine the
remainder of the data the model requires.
• Target levels of critical and deferrable backlog are annual 10% reductions of
reported 1995 levels at each claimant in each IC through 2003.
• All unfunded projects increase in cost at a 3% rate annually.
• Funding levels for each major claimant can vary between 85% and 135% of the
previous year's funding level. Penalties for real increases beyond 135% accrue at
55% of the penalty for exceeding annual critical backlog targets for high priority
facilities; real decreases below 85% of the previous year's total are penalized at
a rate of 45% of the same backlog penalty.
• Money may be borrowed from other 0&:M,N programs at an inflation-free annual
interest rate of 4%. Considering the approximate 2.19% annual inflation rate,
the equivalent market interest rate is 6.28%.
• Deferrable backlog appearing in Appendix D is not reported by year; the model
considers that equal amounts at each claimant in each IC become critical if
unfunded at the end of each year in a five year cycle.
• Relative weights for Shore FLEP high, medium, and low priority facilities are
as computed in Appendix A.
• Chapter III provides a means to determine the backlog weights by specifying a
maximum number of years mc or md the decisionmaker is willing to exceed the
budget in order to reduce critical or deferrable backlog in high priority facilities,
respectively, by one objective function unit (thousands of base year dollars) . For
the base case calculations here, mc = 7 and ma = 3.
• The dual equilibrium approximation (a formulation appears in Appendix B)
constraints are discounted at a rate a — 0.94.
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3. Results
The base case described above was implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS) [Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus 1992] using the OSL [IBM Corporation
1991] solver, with a solution horizon of 20 years. The primal equilibrium approximation,
from which optimal values of the decision variables were taken, had about 54,000 constraints,
98,000 variables, and 256,000 nonzero elements. Solution time was nine minutes on an IBM
RS6000 Model 590 workstation. Except where noted, all variations from the base case
used the same solution horizon, and the bounding techniques described in Walker [1995]
guarantee that the resulting solutions were all within 1% of the infinite horizon optimal
solutions.
Figure 4.1 shows total MRRP budgets, in constant FY96 millions of dollars, from
1995 to 2003. The figure demonstrates the adjustments the model recommends to the
Navy's baseline figures based on willingness to borrow funds to avoid real cost increases
































Figure 4.1. Total MRRP budgets in constant FY96 millions of dollars, from 1995 to 2003. The
base case corresponds to the POM data provided by N442. The two alternatives are OMAR
recommendations (1) when it is free to borrow funds from FY96-03; and (2) when it is only
free to borrow funds from FY99-03. The model borrows in accordance with parameters set by
the decisionmakers, in order to avoid real cost increases incurred by deferral of M&R projects.
Having avoided long term cost increases, the model pays back with interest by coming in under
budget in later years.
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and meet backlog reduction targets in two cases: First, in all years 1996 to 2003; second,
from 1999 to 2003 (useful for examining FY1999 alone). The model's decision to borrow
funds in each case means that the borrowing reduces total multi-year program costs—by
$4.73 million in the first case and $1.78 million in the second—because it is economically
more sensible to pay for M&R projects sooner.
Figure 4.2 shows the model's recommended allocation of funding to the 11 major
claimants considered in FY1999 when borrowing is not allowed—i.e., all annual budgets
are fixed at the levels indicated by OPNAV and appearing in Figure 4.1. Totals for those
claimants who receive 0&M,N funding but do not appear in the allocation have already
been subtracted from the annual total shown. The model's allocation is similar to that
proposed by OPNAV, but it proposes allocating $39.5 million less to PACFLT and $49.5
million more to LANTFLT. The model expects that when the claimants have allocated their





























Figure 4.2. Allocation of FY99 MRRP funding among 11 major claimants, not including
BUPERS, SPAVVAR, SECGRU, NAVSUP, or OTHER. The amount allocated is $879.2 million
of the $888.8 million total O&M.N MRRP, or 98.9%. OMAR was prevented from borrowing
for comparison purposes, and critical and deferrable backlog targets were set at zero because
OPNAV did not necessarily use the 10% annual reduction goals that the base case model runs
assumed.
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budgets for FY96, 97, and 98 among the projects in their long range maintenance plans,
LANTFLT will have a larger backlog of high priority facilities.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 provide a comparative measure of effectiveness for the model's
allocation methods. The figures show the comparison of two model runs: in the first,
claimant budget levels were fixed at the OPNAV totals shown in Appendix D; in the sec-
ond, the model was free to allocate funding but was restricted to the same annual totals.
The purpose for the comparison is to show that Navy-wide needs are better addressed by
systematically ensuring that funding is allocated over time to the claimants who need them
for M&R of facilities of most importance to operational readiness. Figure 4.3 shows FY2000
end-of-year critical backlog in ICs 01 (aviation operational facilities) and 05 (training facil-
ities), both of which consist entirely of facilities in the high priority Shore FLEP category,
as achieved by each model run. Figure 4.4 shows the same measure for ICs 12 (other supply
and storage) and 14 (administrative facilities), which consist entirely of facilities in the low
priority Shore FLEP category. When free to choose how to allocate the funding, the model
achieves a lower end-of-year critical backlog in the high priority facilities, and balances that
by deferring maintenance on the facilities of lower priority to operational readiness. This
highlights the importance of proper allocation: if OPNAV apportions a fixed budget among
the major claimants commensurate with their requirements, weighted by operational readi-
ness priority, more high priority work can be accomplished Navy-wide than when allocations
are not optimal, even when claimants spend their funding optimally in both cases.
4. Sensitivity Analyses
Four principal factors affecting the model's decisions are the interest rate at which
funds are borrowed, changes to the outyear budgets, the decisionmakers' willingness to
borrow to pay for M&R projects, and underreporting of requirements.
a. Borrowing Rate
With other base case factors constant, Figure 4.5 shows a comparison of
annual total budgets from 1995 to 2003 when no borrowing is allowed, borrowing is allowed
at 4% (6.27% market rate), and 7% (9.34% market rate). Predictably, amounts borrowed in
total increase with decreasing rates; and funds are also borrowed sooner. Figure 4.6 shows














Figure 4.3. Comparison of FY2000 end of year critical backlog achieved for two high priority
ICs (01 and 05) by the model when (1) claimant allocations are fixed at the levels in POM
98; and when (2) claimant allocations can vary. The figure demonstrates that funding can be
systematically allocated over time to address particular M&R needs relative to overall Service-
wide goals when those needs can be identified and tracked by claimant, IC, and year.
those with both higher total beginning-of-year requirements and with higher proportions of
projects in higher priority facilities.
b. Outyear Budgets
Figure 4.7 shows the baseline OPNAV annual budgets and two alternatives
for lower outyear budgets with no borrowing permitted. At the baseline totals, projects
in the critical backlog as identified in 1995, plus those becoming critical in the intervening
years, total only $16.4 million at the end of fiscal year 2003; this amount increases to $111.9
million and $532.7 million when the real increases projected to follow FY99 are cut in half or
removed entirely, respectively. The relative size of this backlog in each Shore FLEP priority
category is a better measure of the model's ability to allocate funding in a decreasing budget
environment, because backlog totals are subject to reporting errors inherent in the data.
Figure 4.8 shows that as outyear budgets decrease, facilities most important to operational













Figure 4.4. Comparison of FY2000 end of year critical backlog achieved for two low priority
ICs (12 and 14) by the model when (1) claimant allocations are fixed at the levels in POM 98;
and when (2) claimant allocations can vary. The larger totals shown for the varying case reflect
compensation for the improvement in the high priority ICs, shown in Figure 4.3.
do not. The severity of the contrast observed in Figure 4.8 depends on the relative weights
Wp that distinguish between the Shore FLEP categories.
c. Willingness to Borrow
The maximum number of years a decisionmaker is willing to exceed the bud-
get in order to pay for backlog reduction has virtually no effect on the resulting allocations.
It affects whether or not it is acceptable to borrow funds at all—an important distinction.
Two separate OMAR runs provide comparisons with the base case (rac = 7 and vrid = 3).
In the first alternative, mc and m^ were set at 9 and 5 respectively, indicating that the
model should borrow if it could repay the loans in 9 and 5 years for reduction of critical and
deferrable backlog toward their target (10% annual reduction) levels. The resulting total
multi-year budget was exactly the same as the base case of 7 and 3 years. When mc and
rrid were set to 5 and 1 , respectively, no borrowing occurred at all, and in all three cases the
first year of claimant funding recommendations differed by no more than $2.5 million; no
more than 10% of any claimant's budget shifted (all but two were identical). The number
of years m and the interest rate r together determine both backlog weights and funding
turbulence weights; though changing m therefore changes many model coefficients, they
















Figure 4.5. Total MRRP budgets from 1995 to 2003 when no borrowing is allowed, borrowing
is allowed at an annual interest rate of 4% (6.27% market rate), and when it is allowed at
7% (9.34% market rate). More funding is borrowed earlier when interest rates are lower, as
expected. The amount borrowed depends on the amount by which the end of year maintenance
backlogs would exceed their targets without borrowing.
d. Underreporting of Requirements
Investigating the case where actual requirements far exceed reported re-
quirements is important for two reasons. First, many believe the true M&R needs, those
that would keep all facilities in satisfactory operating condition, to be as much as twice
those reported or more [CNO 1986]. This would be consistent with actual conditions of
insufficient funding for complete inspection and condition reporting programs and with the
understandable failure of those programs to identify and predict all facility M&R require-
ments. Critical backlog is less likely than deferrable backlog to be underreported because
it is, in most cases, a "show-stopper."
The effect of understated requirements was modeled by doubling the re-
ported deferrable backlog. The base case assumptions change because they are unrealistic
in the new scenario: A 4% inflation free interest rate for borrowing, 10% targets for annual
reduction, and willingness to borrow for up to 7 and 3 years for critical and deferrable
backlog combine to yield fantastic borrowing recommendations, topping a $1 billion loan
balance by 1998. New assumptions are a reduced willingness to exceed the budget (no
















Figure 4.6. FY97 critical backlog at the beginning of the year, and claimant budgets under
both no borrowing and borrowing at 4%. The model allocates the additional funding to those
with both higher total beginning-of-year requirements and with higher proportions of projects
in higher priority facilities.
interest rate (7% inflation free), and a 5% annual reduction target for critical backlog in
real terms. With these restrictions, the solution horizon extended to 30 years provided
convergence of primal and dual equilibrium approximations within a tolerance of 5.5% of
the infinite horizon optimal solution. For the 11 major claimants modeled, the results of
Figure 4.9 appear similar to those observed in previous years (a historical comparison of
0&M,N backlog and funding appears in Figure 4.10).
A clear pattern appears in Figure 4.9. Given the option of when to pay
for deferrable or critical backlog, the model reduces deferrable backlog each year in real
terms which ultimately allows it to produce a drastic improvement in critical backlog levels
(this effect is also dependent on increasing budgets in later years). A detailed view of the
model's allocation of dollars between critical and deferrable backlog for the case of claimant
underreporting by 50% appears in Figures 4.11 and 4.12. Both figures show a significant




































Figure 4.7. Three budget scenarios for fiscal years 2000-2003. The baseline are those appearing
in Appendix D from OPNAV; these show a significant real increase in years 2000-2003 compared
with 1999. The other two scenarios cut this increase in half and remove it entirely, respectively.
The purpose is to examine how the model observes prioritization when budgets are reduced.
targets for critical backlog reduction cannot be met. This suggests that aggressively pursu-
ing a thorough facilities inspection program to document and integrate deficiencies into the
maintenance plan before they become critical is helpful in planning for facilities maintenance
and repair in the S&J arena at OPNAV.
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Figure 4.8. End of year 2003 critical backlog in each of three investment categories under
each of the three budget scenarios shown in Figure 4.7. IC 03 (waterfront operational facilities;
high priority) remains near zero, increasing to $8.1 million under the most austere budget. IC
06 (aircraft maintenance production facilities; medium priority) increases to $23.6 million only
when all the real outyear increases are removed. IC 12 (other supply & storage; low priority)
backlog increases dramatically as outyear budgets decrease. Achievement of such low backlog
levels may not be realistic; the results of examining claimant underreporting show much more
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Figure 4.9. Total critical and deferrable backlog by year, in constant FY96 billions of dollars,
and OMAR annual funding recommendations based on conservative decisionmaker judgment.
Totals do not include claimants not submitting the AIS. The optimal solution shown "pays down"
deferrable backlog early to reduce the projects becoming critical in later years. A moderate
amount of borrowing ($41 million in addition to the budget of $766 million in constant 1996
dollars) occurs in FY1999, but otherwise the model follows the POM budget.
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Figure 4.10. Historical O&M.N critical backlog and MRRP funding, in then-year billions of
dollars. Figures do not include physical security projects; FY92-94 figures include demolition
costs. Source: N44 [1995b].
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Figure 4.11. Total critical and deferrable backlog by year, in then-year millions of dollars, and
OMAR annual funding recommendations for the US Atlantic Fleet based on the assumption
that deferrable backlog is underreported by 50%. Even when targets for the reduction of critical
backlog are not being met, and critical targets are weighted more heavily than deferrable targets,
the optimal solution shown pays for deferrable work in order to minimize long term total costs.
In this case, a larger amount of funding is required to pay for deferrable backlog than for critical
backlog.
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Figure 4.12. Total critical and deferrable backlog by year, in then-year millions of dollars,
and OMAR annual funding recommendations for the US Pacific Fleet based on the assumption
that deferrable backlog is underreported by 50%. Even when targets for the reduction of critical
backlog are not being met, and critical targets are weighted more heavily than deferrable targets,





The model developed in this thesis, OMAR, addresses two separate but related deci-
sion problems OPNAV faces. In the planning process, N81 evaluates alternative multi-year
budgets for the RPM program to improve shore installations' contribution to operational
readiness. OMAR helps to balance the yearly funding needs of RPM with those of other
programs by introducing the ability to borrow funds to minimize the cost of the RPM
program over the infinite horizon. It does this while achieving user-specified annual target
levels of maintenance and repair backlog, and observing a facility priority system linked to
operational readiness. In the programming process, N4 allocates multi-year budgets to the
major claimants; OMAR helps to develop budget allocations that address Navy-wide readi-
ness priorities based on reported facility condition and plant value, putting scarce funding
where it is most needed at the right time. No models currently in use by OPNAV provide
these capabilities.
Computational results indicate that when model parameters are set according to
the procedures developed in the thesis, OMAR suggests that planners borrow funds when
economically sensible criteria are satisfied: (1) the decisionmaker indicates a willingness to
exceed the budget; (2) target backlog levels are not being met; and (3) lower long term
net costs result from borrowing. MRRP funding allocations provided by OMAR largely
resemble those prepared by the Navy for POM 98, but generally provide greater funding
than the POM to major claimants reporting larger amounts of high priority critical and
deferrable backlog. A comparison of critical backlog achieved by MRRP funding levels
established in POM 98 with those achieved by an optimal allocation restricted by the same
fixed annual budgets shows that more high priority work—that most relevant to operational
needs—is accomplished Navy-wide with an optimal OMAR allocation. In this way, OMAR
forces M&R funding to address operational readiness.
Investigating the case where actual requirements exceed reported requirements pro-
duces multi-year funding and backlog data similar to that observed in previous years, sug-
gesting that actual requirements are understated in annual reports. Explicit modeling of
deferrable backlog, not previously accomplished, shows that early identification and report-
ing of noncritical M&R projects leads to better decisions regarding multi-year total budget
levels and claimant funding allocations, and to better long term management of critical
backlog.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
OMAR relies on AIS reports to depict facility condition accurately Navy-wide, but
the implementation presented in Chapter IV does not use the detailed data available in
the installations' long range maintenance plans. Availability of these data would allow
explicit modeling of near-term (one to five years) M&R requirements to improve the model's
recommendations
.
Long range maintenance plans allow proper construction and justification of M&R
budgets and major claimant allocations, but they do not predict future requirements accu-
rately beyond two or three years. Data collection and analysis to support better predictions
are necessary. Analysts, however, face a difficult task in that the Navy cannot afford to
pay for proper upkeep of all facilities. Facility component lifetime data need to be based
on condition and maintenance patterns over time, and not on engineering or maintenance
standards that assume condition and maintenance are independent of funding adequacy.
These studies would provide better projections of changes in long term facility condition
resulting from funding decisions.
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APPENDIX A. DETERMINATION OF FACILITY PRIORITY
WEIGHTS
CNO [1989] relates facility condition to the Navy's operational readiness by defin-
ing high, -medium, and low priority facility categories. Quantifying the priorities enables
OMAR to allocate funding based on stated readiness needs. This appendix presents an im-
plementation of the LINPAC method of Horsky and Rao [1984] to establish relative weights
for Shore FLEP facility priorities. Terminology and notation are from their paper, except
for using "alternatives" instead of "brands."
The method quantifies relative preferences among n alternatives that are character-
ized by m common attributes. It assumes that an additive multi-attribute value function
(e.g., Rosenthal [1985] or Ringuest [1992]) adequately describes relative preferences for the
alternatives based on the attributes. A decisionmaker examines all Q) possible pairs of
alternatives by comparing their relative scores with respect to the common attributes, and
provides two pieces of information: (1) the preferred alternative; and (2) the difference in
preference of the alternatives ("none," "small," "moderate," or "large"). Based on this
information, a linear goal program determines a set of attribute weights that are most
consistent with the stated preferences and preference differences.
Quantitative information needed consists of the scores of each alternative on each
of the m attribute scales. Define:
Xj Ideal level of attribute j;
yij score of alternative i on attribute j; and
dij distance of alternative i from the ideal level of attribute j.
The objective in the current setting is to determine the relative degree facilities in
each Shore FLEP priority category (high, medium, and low) contribute to Navy readiness
by being in good condition. A natural qualitative measure of their contribution is the
percent of CPV in a BASEREP Cl or C2 facility condition status (fully or substantially
meets mission requirements, respectively). In the terminology of Horsky and Rao, the three
attributes pertaining to each alternative evaluated are the percentages of CPV in Cl or C2
condition status for each of the three facility priority categories. Further, each alternative
corresponds to a notional set of facilities listed by their BASEREP facility condition in





Xj 100% CI or C2 facility condition;
yij percent of alternative i, priority j facilities in Cl or C2 facility condition;
and define ckj = (xj — yij) 2 so that increasing values of y^ produce decreasing marginal
benefit.
The goal programming formulation of LINPAC appearing in Horsky and Rao [1984]
is reproduced below along with a brief explanation.
Indices
p, q Alternatives, 1,2, ... ,n;
r, s, t, u Indices aliasing p and q;
j Attributes, 1, 2, . .
.
, m; and
/i, k Levels of preference, k
€ {1, . .
.
, 4}; h € {1, 2, 3} where 1 = none, 2 = small, 3
= moderate, 4 = large.
Data
dqj Distance of alternative q from the ideal level of attribute j;
S Set of all ordered pairs (q,p) where the decisionmaker prefers alternative q to
alternative p; and
Sk Set («Sfc C S) of all ordered pairs (q, p) where the decisionmaker prefers alterna-
tive q to alternative p at level of preference k.
Variables
Wj Relative weight of attribute j, dimensionless;
zQjP Preference inconsistency between alternatives q,p measured in terms of weighted
distance;
vs ,r,t,u Degree-of-preference inconsistency between alternative pairings (s, r) and (£, u),




Minimize ]T zq# + ]T J^ vs^ t ,u
q,peS k:(s,r)eSk h<k:(t,u)eSh
£>j(dgj- - dpj) \ + zq ,p > V(g,p) € <S; (A.l)
Yl w3(ds,j ~ drj ~ dt,j + du,j) > +vs ,r,t,u > V(s, r) € <Sfc ; (t, -a) e <Sh , h< k < 4; (A.2)
m
£)tt»i-l; (A.3)
all ity-, 2g>p , ws , r; ()U > 0. (A.4)
Constraints (A.l) measure inconsistency in the weighted distance differences between al-
ternatives q and p where the decisionmaker has a preference for alternative q. Constraints
(A.2) measure inconsistency in the stated degrees of preference for alternative pairs (5, r)
and (t,u). For example, if s is preferred over r to a large degree but t is preferred to u to a
small degree, and V(q) is the value of alternative q determined by the weighted distances of
its attributes from their ideal values, then (V'(s) — V(r)) — (V(t) — V(u)) > 0. For the cases
in which this difference is negative, the decisionmaker's judgement is inconsistent with the
attribute weights, and uS)r,t,u > 0.
Five sets of notional facility mix alternatives, for comparison on the basis of facility
condition in each priority category, appear in Table A.l. A representative set of alternative
preferences and preference differences, in Table A.2, provides the qualitative input for the
LINPAC procedure.
For this example, LINPAC determines the optimal (most consistent) weights Wj to
be 0.4895, 0.3125, and 0.1980 for high, medium, and low priority facilities respectively. In
other words, for this decisionmaker, the readiness of low priority facilities is 40% as impor-
tant as that of high priority facilities, and medium priority facilities are 64% as important.
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yq ,j x 100 dqj
Alternative q High Medium Low High Medium Low
1 95 67 53 0.0026 0.1093 0.2205
2 90 54 66 0.0101 0.2085 0.1136
3 72 82 53 0.0772 0.0334 0.2239
4 76 56 89 0.0586 0.1961 0.0131
5 85 70 80 0.0225 0.0900 0.0400
Table A.l. Five alternatives for comparison to determine quantitative weights for facility prior-
ities. yqj represent the percentage of facilities of priority j that are rated in Cl or C2 condition
by BASEREP criteria; dqj = (1 — yqj)
2
are the squared deviations from the ideal 100%. A
response set of preferences and preference differences appears in Table A. 2.












Table A.2. Pairwise comparisons of alternatives given in Table A.l. The decisionmaker prefers
alternative 1 to 4 with a "moderate" difference in preference; but he or she is indifferent between
alternatives 1 and 5.
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APPENDIX B. FINITE HORIZON APPROXIMATIONS
Versions of the linear programs in Chapters III and IV with finite horizons can produce
unreasonable solutions. Walker [1995] describes a number of approximation methods for
solving infinite horizon linear programs (truncation, salvage, fixed end conditions, and pri-
mal and dual equilibrium approximations), and provides a general algorithm for bounding
infinite horizon linear and integer programs with the use of the primal and dual equi-
librium approximations. For linear programs, formulation of primal and dual equilibrium
approximations require an overlapping, "staircase" structure similar to that of the following






Kxt+Axt+i > 6(t+l), £ = 0,1,2,





The primal equilibrium approximation of (P) is a finite (T-period) formulation that places
a restriction on the feasible region, typically by requiring that xt+\ = xt for t > T. The
useful properties of this formulation are that its optimal objective function value is an upper
bound to the optimal objective function value of (F); and that the optimal values of its
decision variables, {xf ; t = 0, 1, 2, . . . T}, are feasible to (P).
The dual equilibrium approximation of (P) is a finite formulation that relaxes the
feasible region, typically by aggregating constraints (B.3) for t > T — 1 into a single set of
constraints, discounting with factor a:
a a
K A " XT-i '
K A xT > a a bj
or
KxT-! + (aK + A)Y] a l-Tx t > —^~
r~i, l — a
(B.5)
t=T
where, for this problem, Xt have dimension n x 1, K and A have dimension m x n, br has
dimension m x 1, and the elements of the row vectors have dimension 1 x m. The constraints
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(B.5) correspond to a single n x 1 vector of decision variables xa — Ylt^T <^~Txt- The dual
equilibrium formulation, provided it exists, always provides a lower bound on the optimal
objective function of the infinite horizon minimization problem.
Walker [1995] uses the upper and lower bound properties of the primal and dual
equilibrium reformulations together to bound the error associated with finite horizon ap-
proximations. The general algorithm iteratively increases the number of periods in the
horizon until the difference between the objective function values of the primal and dual
equilibrium reformulations is within a specified tolerance. The optimal values of the deci-
sion variables for the period(s) of interest are taken from the primal equilibrium solution,
because they are guaranteed to be feasible to the infinite horizon problem.
The OMAR formulations appearing in Chapters III and IV have the overlapping
structure indicated in the problem (P). The following sections provide primal and dual
equilibrium reformulations of the model in Chapter IV, and demonstrate convergence of
the approximations for that instance.
A. Primal Equilibrium Approximation
The objective function (4.3) is replaced with: Minimize
T -i / k \ r-i / fc >
Y Y At '° d ( BMARcxt +Y/DWcxyt ) +Y Y ATo ,o7t_T°d I BMARcxt +YDWc*yt
c,x t=l \ y=l / c,x f=T \ y=l /
+Y ATofi^—^d I BMARcxT +YDWcxyT )






+ Y At,orLBt + Y ^Tofil'-^rLBt + ATo , y—^rXJ3T
t=l t=T 7
/To-1 T-l t_ Tq \
+Y cbwtcx Y &tfiCBDEVcxt + Y ^TofiY'^CBDEV^t + &Tofi2-—CBDEVcxT
c,x \ t=l t=T 1 )
(To-1 T-l t_ Tq \
Y &tfiDBDEVcxt + Y &T ,o'yt~ToDBDEVcxt + ATofiY^-DBDEVcxT
*=1 t=T ! 7 j
/T -l T-l T-T \
+YPturwtc ( Y &t,oPTURBct + Y ^T ,o^' ToPTURBct + ATofi^—^PTURBcT )
c V t=l t=T ^ 1 /
fTo-1
T-l t_ Tq \
Y AtfiNTURB* + Y ^Tofi^'^NTURBct + ATo,o-t—^NTURBcT J
(B.6)
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Constraints (4.4-4.20) are identical in the primal equilibrium approximation with fiscal
years t limited to between and T, the solution horizon. Additional constraints required
so that X t+i = X t for all variables X with t >T are:
( 1 - ^-^
J
BMARcxT = DWcx0T - FCcxT Vc, x; (B.7)
O^cxyr = £>WCX j+ir- FDcxyT \fc,x;y<k-l; and (B.8)
^ FDciyT + J^ FCclT + ^-LBT < budgetT + LBT (B.9)
c,i,y c,x
For all t > T, constraints (B.7) replace (4.6), (B.8) replace (4.12), and (B.9) replace (4.15).
B. Dual Equilibrium Approximation
This formulation changes the factor by which the objective function coefficients are
discounted after year T from 7 to a < 7. The primal equilibrium approximation objective
function discounts year t < T terms at rate 7. To ensure that the two approximations can
converge within an arbitrarily small e at optimality, this formulation treats terms indexed
with t < T exactly as does the primal approximation. As in Walker [1995], define the
additional variables Xa = Y^tZr oti~TXt for all variables X.
The objective function (4.3), in the dual equilibrium approximation, becomes:
Minimize
To-l/ k \ T-l / k \
Y Y At >od ( BMARcxt + Y. DWc*y* I + 51 J2 ATo ,o7£ " r°rf ( BMARcxt + J2DWcxyt
c,x t=\ \ y=l / c,x t=T \ y=l /
+Y ^To ,olT' To d ( BMARcxa + J2DWcxya
J
c,x \ y=l /
To-l T-l
+ Y &t,orLBt + Y Ar^o^-^rLBt + ^To ,olT~ T°rLBa
t=l t=T
(To-l T-l \
Y At , CBDEVcxt + Y &T ,o'Yt-T°€BDEVcxt + ATofifT- ToCBDEVcxa J
t=l t=T /
(To-l T-l \
Y &t,oDBDEVcxt + Y, ATofil'-^DBDEVcxt + ATo^T- ToDBDEVcxa
t=l t=T /
(To-l T-l \









Constraints (4.4-4.20) remain in force but only for t < T — 1. Aggregating the remaining
constraints with discounting, as in (B.5), produces the following additional constraints:
(l - (1 + <*)-) BMARcxa =—BMMci t-i + DWcx0a - FCcxa V c, x. (B.ll)
BMARcxa <
en
fCcxT + CBDEVcxa V c, x. (B.12)
1 — a
k
J2DWcxya<^^ + DBDEVcxa Vc,x. (B.13)
±±±DWCX y+1 r-i + (1 + d)-WCI y+1 ft = DWCIva + FDCItt V c, x, y < k - 1; (B.14)
7 7
Wciya = YT-defercxy+T - FDcxy0c V c, x; y = fe. (B.15)
(B.16)
c,i,y c,x
FDciya = V c, i = OTHER, y > 0. (B.17)
1-aF£>ciya > ;
—
— VC2 = OTHER, y = 0. (B.18)
7~Wy I J^FD^t-i I - NTURBca
< (1 - -t>an/ ) I J^FJ^ + J]FCcia
J
V c; (B.19)
\ *>» z /
(1 - -Mfy) I ^ FDa2/Q + J2 FC"
\i,y x
< 7- 'vary £ FL>ciy r-i +£FC^ r- 1 ) + PTURBca V c. (B.20)
\ i,y * /
Differences between the objective function (B.10) and that appearing in the infinite horizon
formulation follow directly from the substitution of variables Xa for {Xt,Xt+i, .
.
.}.
C. CONVERGENCE FOR POM-98 DATA
Applying the preceding formulations to the data the Navy used in preparing the
1998-2003 POM shows that the primal and dual equilibrium optimal objective function
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OMAR Convergence, POM 98
R-imal Equilibrium
Dual Equilibrium
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Fiscal Year of Solution Horizon
2008
Figure B.l. Performance of OMAR primal and dual equilibrium approximations for the 1998
POM data set. In this instance, the two objective functions converge to the same value only
one year beyond the end of the decision horizon.
values converge for solution horizons T in excess of nine years (ending in 2004), only one
year beyond the desired length of the decision horizon. These objective function values
appear in Figure B.l. While extending the solution horizon beyond the point of convergence
of primal and dual equilibrium approximations yields the same optimal objective function
value, the funding recommendations for the final two or three years continue to change. In
practice, we discover that the alternate optima corresponding to longer solution horizons
tend to produce more reasonable funding recommendations.
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF ACRONYMS
AIS Annual Inspection Summary
BASEREP Shore Base Readiness Report
BMAR Backlog of Maintenance and Repair
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure
BUPERS Bureau of Naval Personnel
CCB Construction Criteria Base
CEC Civil Engineer Corps
CNET Chief of Naval Education and Training
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions
CPMS Capital Program Management System
CPV Current Plant Value
CUPB Commercial Unit Price Book
DBOF Defense Business Operating Fund
DoD Department of Defense
DoN Department of the Navy
EFA Engineering Field Activity
EFD Engineering Field Division
FCG Facility Category Group
FH,N Family Housing, Navy
FLEP Facilities Life Extension Program
GAMS General Algebraic Modeling System
HQMC Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
IBR Investment Balance Review
IC Investment Category
ISR Installation Status Report
LANTFLT US Atlantic Fleet
LINPAC Linear programming for alternative comparison
LRMP Long Range Maintenance Plan(ning)
M&R Maintenance and Repair
MACOM Major Army Command
METOC Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command
MRPM Maintenance Resource Prediction Model
MRRP Maintenance and Repair of Real Property
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command
NAVEUR US Naval Forces Europe
NAVINTEL Naval Intelligence Command
NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NCTC Naval Computers and Telecommunications Command

























Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps
Operations and Maintenance, Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
US Pacific Fleet
Army helicopter fleet optimization model
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
Program Objective Memorandum
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
Plant Replacement Value
Navy Public Works Center
Navy Public Works Detachment





Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command
Sponsor Program Proposal
Strategic Systems Program
United States Military Academy
Work Breakdown Structure
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APPENDIX D. BACKLOG, FUNDING, AND CPV DATA
This appendix contains the data used to produce the results presented in Chapter
IV. It was provided by N44 and Headquarters, NAVFAC.
CPV by Shore FLEP Priority 1995SM
Claimant Total CPV High Percent Medium Percent Low Percent
CNET 7,392.0 4,636.6 63.7 1,070.6 14.5 1,687.8 23.8
CNO 4,069.6 2,867.8 70.5 446.2 11.0 756.5 19.6
LANTFLT 11,924.2 6,705.8 56.2 2,562.4 21.5 2,657.0 22.3
METOC 67.5 20.0 30.0 0.5 1.7 46.0 69.2
NAVAIR 884.7 352.4 40.9 331.0 37.4 200.4 23.7
NAVEUR 850.3 517.3 61.8 236.1 28.8 97.8 11.4
NAVFAC 970.1 442.6 46.5 88.5 9.0 441.9 45.5
NAVSEA 2,897.8 1,238.1 43.7 959.7 33.1 700.0 24.2
NCTC 1,296.9 919.4 71.9 45.2 3.5 331.3 26.6
PACFLT 13,681.8 7,488.6 55.7 3,189.7 23.3 3,004.5 22.0
SSP 584.1 171.5 29.2 281.7 48.1 133.8 23.7
TOTAL 44,613.0 25,354.3 57.8 9,207.6 21.6 10,052.1 23.5
Table D.l. 1995 O&M.N CPV by major claimant and Shore FLEP priority, taken from the
1995 Naval Facilities Assets Database with guidance from HQ, NAVFAC. Subtotals shown do
not include property the NFADB indicated was non-Navy real property, because these properties
are not reported in ICs 1-18 on the AIS. They do, however, include properties with excess codes
1-3, meaning the property could have been declared excess and therefore not be reportable on











Table D.2. Inflation indices for the 0&M,N appropriation with base year 1995. Source: N44.
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Investment Category
Claimant 01 02 03 04 05 06
CNET 12,390 40 7,004 1,485 35,198 15,857
CNO 4,219 3,719 10,185 1,095 55,922
LANTFLT 50,016 4,160 53,100 12,281 13,898 71,534
METOC 3 1,020
NAVAIR 141 5 747 10 2,246 3,660
NAVEUR 6,393 823 1,032 2,629 663 4,342
NAVFAC 34 6 1,785 208 240
NAVSEA 5 19,015 456 1
NCTC 5,254 2,501 102
PACFLT 26,084 1,540 99,685 13,796 8,596 24,208
SSP 25 3,169 169
Total 99,280 15,577 198,223 32,231 117,784 119,601
Claimant 07 08 09 10 11 12
CNET 82 1,306 107 1 1,844
CNO 152 7,478 90 24 2,882
LANTFLT 8,161 10,008 818 1,004 2,558 11,643
METOC 9 2,290 164 2
NAVAIR 26 237 110 223
NAVEUR 4,646 146 554 1,823
NAVFAC 392 3,888 68 22 5,006
NAVSEA 1,102 3,913 5 250 2 3,751
NCTC 481 134 16 698
PACFLT 8,009 12,359 448 14 13,387 12,251
SSP 1,686 914 562 102
Total 17,898 45,800 4,780 2,041 17,104 40,225
Claimant 13 14 15 16 17 18 Total
CNET 1,669 32,649 135,365 17,668 10,219 13,301 286,185
CNO 3,501 58,811 175,786 29,503 65,354 38,214 456,935
LANTFLT 3,468 35,018 92,038 47,565 74,232 33,650 525,152
METOC 2,920 68 6 796 750 8,028
NAVAIR 138 2,262 7,675 5,568 473 378 23,899
NAVEUR 517 6,788 21,518 8,524 12,416 2,722 75,536
NAVFAC 32 3,758 3,942 3,397 12,006 22,108 56,892
NAVSEA 46 3,597 15,938 2,687 270 40 51,078
NCTC 103 435 2,410 2,159 7,433 2,605 24,331
PACFLT 3,461 17,082 127,529 59,138 27,058 25,591 480,236
SSP 13,362 442 474 663 2,466 24,034
Total 12,935 176,682 582,711 176,689 210,920 141,825 2,012,306
Table D.3. O&M.N critical backlog in FY1995 thousands of dollars by major claimant and
investment category. Source: N44 [1995b].
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Investment Category
Claimant 01 02 03 04 05 06
CNET 9,898 276 6,953 2,042 16,393 17,935
CNO 267 184 8,717 2,437 28,312 182
LANTFLT 40,084 2,882 39,211 13,317 21,507 22,710
METOC
NAVAIR 2,517 77 4,797 155 4,027 5,928
NAVEUR 3,672 172 598 838 101 437
NAVFAC 6 27 1,110 293 877
NAVSEA 8 2,026 301 2,568 1
NCTC 2,969 512 110 37
PACFLT 23,583 1,448 56,926 7,839 7,480 16,159
SSP 172 5,097 794
Total 80,027 8,215 125,947 28,126 81,302 63,352
Claimant 07 08 09 10 11 12
CNET 93 7,113 8 367 243 7,984
CNO 197 1,356 2 1,799
LANTFLT 11,643 16,462 1,447 1,820 3,676 20,376
METOC
NAVAIR 481 435 435 774
NAVEUR 1,466 2,524 165 2,837
NAVFAC 70 1,402 2 6 22 1,552
NAVSEA 427 1,839 371 272 209 2,828
NCTC 696 15 29 313
PACFLT 7,108 12,714 650 351 18,190 14,733
SSP 230 1,191 1,452 40 318
Total 19,768 44,720 4,380 5,369 22,982 53,514
Claimant 13 14 15 16 17 18 Total
CNET 749 13,629 129,076 24,681 6,427 27,797 271,664
CNO 2 21,312 4,716 10,815 13,640 7,442 101,380
LANTFLT 10,885 29,931 199,209 68,918 31,326 33,741 569,145
METOC 813 55 5 713 1,586
NAVAIR 705 2,527 5,067 5,178 5,520 3,425 42,048
NAVEUR 59 9,880 13,670 5,715 3,800 1,535 47,469
NAVFAC 105 8,382 1,870 2,656 1,919 8,839 29,138
NAVSEA 508 2,640 6,760 10,654 1,253 1,958 34,623
NCTC 10 348 1,124 1,558 5,546 4,476 17,743
PACFLT 995 12,815 80,166 40,645 21,307 45,838 368,947
SSP 374 682 236 211 10.797
Total 14,018 102,651 441,713 171,502 90,979 135,975 1,494,540
Table D.4. Deferrable backlog in FY1995 thousands of dollars by major claimant and investment
category. Source: AIS reports provided by N44. Calculations in Chapter IV assume that these
totals represent present worth of all deferrable project costs over a five year span, and that equal














Table D.5. MRRP claimant execution totals for IC OTHER in fiscal year 1995 thousands
of dollars. Source: N44. These figures were used in Chapter IV computations as annual
"nondiscretionary" amounts required by each claimant, adjusting for inflation, in each of the
subsequent years.
Major Fiscal Year
Claimant 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CNET 122,648 124,032 92,982 93,415 104,471 134,896 139,577 157,259 169,500
CNO 83,464 95,537 89,643 98,432 103,583 81,035 77,670 84,700 76,482
LANTFLT 243,927 221,955 219,673 186,002 188,197 244,558 263,141 299,041 331,321
METOC 3,967 6,402 4,925 5,030 5,905 6,056 6,913 6,827 6,531
NAVAIR 29,319 28,724 24,222 26,585 25,208 26,141 29,245 33,741 37,223
NAVEUR 31,412 56,839 41,355 43,301 36,823 49,396 51,334 54,716 55,885
NAVFAC 54,747 35,968 24,729 33,677 37,296 38,293 45,046 68,231 75,855
NAVSEA 35,440 34,541 27,120 24,042 27,020 26,292 25,981 32,197 35,284
NCTC 11,563 23,120 11,189 9,670 8,287 7,655 9,988 7,723 6,095
PACFLT 252,674 282,779 229,219 231,157 214,151 249,590 337,569 339,064 369,877
SSP 11,292 16,491 14,547 13,783 14,790 15,381 15,682 16,003 16,358
Subtotal 880,453 926,388 779,604 765,094 765,731 879,293 1,002,146 1,099,502 1,180,411
BUPERS 8,747 9,377
NAVSUP 1,065 5,821 4,916 5,459 6,314 6,705 7,043 7,194 7,346
SPAWAR 1,138 1,243 1,035 996 1,252 1,389 1,700 1,739 1,782
SECGRU 5,283 2,307 3,609 1,520 1,441 1,457 1,502 1,533 1,566
OTHER 5,500 111,100 97,700
Total 887,939 944,506 798,541 773,069 774,738 888,844 1,017,891 1,221,068 1,288,805
Table D.6. MRRP totals by major claimant and fiscal year, in then-year thousands of dollars.
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